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TAKING MORAL ARGUMENT SERIOUSLY
ROBIN WEST*
In the early seventies, Ronald Dworkin wrote a series of
influential essays in which he claimed that legal argument is and
ought to be a distinctive sort of moral practice: when done well, legal
argument seeks answers to legal questions by interpreting existing
legal precedent in light of the best available conception of justice,
yielding a morally justified answer to virtually all open questions of
law.1 Legal argument, Dworkin argued, contra the prevailing positivist
wisdom, uniquely blends legal and moral norms: the best statement of
law in any area is inevitably intertwined with the moral norms that
animate the general legal field within which the legal proposition has
meaning.2 Furthermore, it is precisely these moral norms, or
principles, that render the law determinate-it is because of the
existence and the force of governing moral principles that legal
questions are susceptible to unique and accurate resolution.3 These
moral principles, and their legal status, thus guarantee both the justice
of law and the determinacy of our legal rights. They render law both
moral and certain.
Moreover, Dworkin eventually went on to claim, the
determinacy and the justice of law are interrelated, and in an
important way. Law recognizes and enforces our rights, in Dworkin's
view, and our central, most defining right is our right to be treated
equally and with respect by law.4 That right to equal treatment and
respect in turn entails a right to both a definitive and correct
adjudication where other rights are called in question: to have one's
rights adjudicated in a way dissimilar to the way in which other
similar cases were decided, or to have one's rights adjudicated
capriciously or prejudicially or whimsically, is a denial of one's basic
* Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center. B.A. University of Maryland,
1976; J.D. University of Maryland, 1979; J.S.M. 1982, Stanford Law School.
1. See RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 14-80, 81-130, 150-205 (1977)
[hereinafter TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY].
2. See id. at 46-130.
3. See Ronald Dworkin, Pragmatism, Right Answers, and True Banality, in PRAGMATISM
IN LAW AND SOCIETY 359 (Michael Brint & William Weaver eds., 1991).
4. See TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY, supra note 1, at 272-74.
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right to equal concern and respect by law. That right to a definitive
and correct adjudication of one's legal rights can, in turn, only be
fulfilled by a system of law that has integrity:5 a system that treats
similar cases similarly, that is not affected by irrelevant
considerations, that holds itself above the sway of partisanship, that
treats all cases according to rules and principles that preexist the
conflict in question. Without the right to legal judgments that
correctly articulate and then enforce our rights, the rights themselves
are meaningless. Accordingly, for Dworkin, the determinacy,
integrity, coherence, and "wholeness" of law are central to its moral
standing and to our status as free and equal individuals deserving its
respect. In short, law requires and hence incorporates norms of
justice; justice requires determinacy and, therefore, law must be
determinate.
In the ensuing twenty-five years, Dworkin's seminal account of
the nature of legal argument has been so thoroughly challenged that
it is questionable whether it can fairly be called the dominant
conception. The most devastating line of attack has targeted
Dworkin's claim that moral principles, in conjunction with legal
precedent, determine uniquely correct legal outcomes-what
Dworkin sometimes called the "right answer" thesis.6 The
counterclaim has been that this assertion simply does not square with
the facts. According to his critics, Dworkin is just wrong to insist on
the "right answer" thesis, or what others call law's determinacy. Many
legal questions, if not most or all, seem to be susceptible to two or
more equally plausible legal analyses. If so, then it is hard to see how
law can generate determinate answers, guarantee its own integrity, or
secure our individual rights to equal treatment in the way Dworkin
insists it must.
In this essay, I propose to put to one side, at least initially, the
question of law's determinacy, and even its place in Dworkin's
jurisprudence. I want to suggest that the question of the law's
determinacy, itself prompted by Dworkin's "right answer" thesis, has
overshadowed what may be the more significant jurisprudential
function of the moral principles Dworkin identified: those principles,
according to Dworkin, render the law not only determinate, but they
5. See RONALD DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE 164-67, 176-224 (1986).
6. Two recent law review symposia have focused on critiques of Dworkin's thesis; see
Symposium, Fidelity in Constitutional Theory, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 1247 (1997); and
Symposium, In Praise of Theory, 29 ARIz. L.J. 351 (1997), for articles and responses by
Dworkin and his critics.
[Vol. 74:499
TAKING MORAL ARGUMENT SERIOUSLY
also render the law substantively just. Without the moral principles
that are inextricably blended in the fabric of law, Dworkin argued,
the law's claim to our obedience would be thin and its claim to our
loyalty would be nonexistent. 7 The law that claims our loyalty and
obedience is the law that incorporates a decent understanding of the
moral principles that find expression within it.
Such law may, but at times may not, be the "law" as articulated
by high courts.8 The legal actor may, but again at times may not,
express his or her loyalty to law so understood through compliance
with the pronouncements of high legal authorities. The legal actor is
loyal to law, principally understood in light of a conception of justice,
not positive law as authoritatively pronounced by a court or
legislative body. Legal argument, in turn, is the practice that gives
daily voice and substance to this distinctively moral loyalty. I will
refer to this attribute of the principles Dworkin identified, and more
generally to this aspect of his jurisprudence, as the "antipositivist
thesis," or more simply, Dworkin's antipositivism. My general claim is
that we should be taking Dworkin's antipositivism much more
seriously than we do and his claims regarding law's determinism-the
"right answer" thesis-considerably less seriously.
To be sure, the antipositivism and the "right answer thesis," in
Dworkin's own view, are importantly linked: for Dworkin, a strict
legal determinacy is a central, perhaps the central, component of a
moral system of law. Without it, law loses its claim to moral
legitimacy. Determinacy, for Dworkin, is necessary to law's moral
legitimacy and hence to its claim to justice, and it is surely because of
that, that his critics have focussed so heavily on Dworkin's claim that
morally justified law must be determinate. Nevertheless, both
Dworkin and his critics may be wrong to think that justice requires
such a high degree of determinacy, and if so, then Dworkin and his
critics both may have emphasized the wrong feature of his
jurisprudence. We may have been unwise to underplay the
implications of Dworkin's antipositivist conception of law, and we
may have been led to do so, at least in part, by our obsession with his
claim of law's determinacy.
7. See TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY, supra note 1, at 206-22.




Let me just spell out three implications of Dworkin's
antipositivism, at least the third of which, and possibly the first two as
well, have been underexamined in the wake of Dworkin's
jurisprudential breakthrough. First, Dworkin's antipositivism implies
a distinctive view of legal and judicial authority which we ought to be
taking seriously, whether or not we ultimately embrace it: if law
incorporates moral principles of justice, then those legal
pronouncements of positivistically authoritative political bodies that
are substantively unjust may be unlawful as well. Positive political
authority does not suffice to guarantee legality, if lawfulness requires
a minimal threshold of justice. Second, Dworkin's antipositivism
implies a distinctive conception of the lawyer's and judge's moral role
and duty: if law incorporates moral principles of justice, then the
lawyer, as well as the judge, while upholding or articulating the law, is
essentially an architect of justice and of a just society, as well as being
an enforcer of order, and of an orderly one. As Bill Simon has
recently argued, the lawyer, on Dworkin's understanding, ought to
view herself as engaged in the zealous advocacy of justice, rather than
in the zealous advocacy of her clients' interests, and furthermore
ought to act accordingly. 9 And third, Dworkin's antipositivism implies
a distinctive conception of legal education and legal scholarship. If
legal educators are serious in their pedagogical and scholarly
missions, and if law incorporates principles of justice, then it is
incumbent upon us as legal educators to develop, debate, sift through,
improve upon, dwell on, preserve, learn, and teach, as an integral part
of law, competing and credible theories of justice. If law incorporates
justice, and if our mission is to teach and study law, then our mission
is obviously to teach and study justice as well.
All of these are important consequences, which, if taken
seriously, would entail radical departures from practice, as well as
from professional habits of the heart and mind. Only a few of us and
then only occasionally regard the unjust but authoritative
pronouncements of the Supreme Court or of Congress or of the
United States Constitution as unlawful because unjust, and when any
such opinion is asserted, it is typically heard as evidencing the
speaker's lack of regard for Rule of Law values.10 Similarly, lawyers
9. See WILLIAM H. SIMON, THE PRACTICE OF JUSTICE (1998).
10. See Paul L. Colby, Two Views on the Legitimacy of Nonacquiescence in Judicial
Opinions, 61 TUL. L. REV. 1041 (1987) (discussing then Attorney General Edwin Meese's
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do not typically understand their professional duty as running to the
zealous advocacy of justice, rather than to the zealous advocacy of
their clients' interests. Codes of Professional Responsibility identify
the lawyer's duty as running to the client, rather than to justice.1"
Most important, however, law professors and law schools
notoriously neglect the subject of justice, both in teaching and in our
scholarship.12 Possibly the least appreciated implication of Dworkin's
antipositivism is that it would force us to correct this: Dworkin's
antipositivism, taken seriously, requires us as teachers and scholars
and students to develop theories and accounts of justice, as part of
our obligation to develop and defend theories regarding the
substance of the law. We presently don't do so. Beyond a vague sense
that cases ought to be treated alike or in a principled and unbiased
manner, we have no developed account of what even the narrow
virtue of legal justice might be or of what traits of character it
requires, what view of the person it entails, or what kind of society
might best facilitate its dispensation.13 More telling, however, with
only a few exceptions, we have no developed or competing
understandings of the substantive, legal consequences of various
conceptions of substantive, social, or political justice. What does some
specified conception of justice imply, regarding the scope of tort,
contract, or constitutional law? Doesn't John Rawls' maximin
principle, taken seriously and taken as a maxim of justice, suggest the
injustice of this culture's maldistribution of wealth, and if we take
seriously the suggestion that law must rest on a sound conception of
justice, doesn't this suggest the possible unconstitutionality of our
current tax system? Doesn't Nozick's historicist understanding of
justice imply the moral necessity of reparations to the Indians, to
Japanese Americans, and to African Americans, and hence the
constitutional necessity of affirmative action? Doesn't even a bare
Hobbesian understanding of the requirements of justice underscore
familial rights to be free of domestic violence in the home? If we took
advocacy of ignoring non-originalist Supreme Court opinions); Sanford Levinson, Could Meese
Be Right This Time?, 61 TUL. L. REV. 1071 (1987).
11. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.3 (1988); MODEL CODE OF
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY Canon 7, DR 7-101 (1980); see also SIMON, supra note 9, at 26,
40.
12. I've written on this phenomenon elsewhere. See Robin West, Toward Humanistic
Theories of Legal Justice, 10 CARDOZO STUD. L. & LITERATURE 147 (1998).
13. There are of course important exceptions to this general neglect. See ANTHONY T.
KRONMAN, THE LOST LAWYER: FAILING IDEALS OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION (1993); Antonin
Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1175 (1989); Cass R. Sunstein,
On Analogical Reasoning, 106 HARV. L. REV. 741 (1993).
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seriously the idea that legal arguments-whether about the scope of
tort law, about the meaning of constitutional rights to equal
protection, or the right to property, or to security and safety-must
rest on and transparently incorporate a viable account of justice, then
a part of the work of law, of the lawyer, and of the law scholar would
be to self-consciously trace these implications. With only a few
exceptions-Frank Michelman's early work on the unconstitutionality
of disproportionate school funding,14 Richard Epstein's early work on
the moral foundations of strict liability,15 and Jules Coleman's work
on the moral foundation of negligence law16 - we haven't felt the need
to do that. And we haven't felt the need to do that, in part, because
we haven't taken seriously the possibility that legal argument is or
ought to be distinctively antipositivist.
Most generally, if we took seriously the possible antipositivism of
legal argument, we would be pressed with the need to articulate the
moral raison d'etre of law and, hence, of lawyering, in a way that
either exposed or went beyond the skeletal claim that the purpose of
law is to keep the civic peace. If the purpose of law is to secure justice
rather than only order, then the professional purpose of lawyering is
as well, and if so it behooves us to address the question of what such a
commitment requires and what such a commitment might imply for
other nonlegal aspects of public or civic life as well. Lawyers, by
virtue of our professional and defining commitment to justice, for
example, might be fairly expected to take a moral position on issues
of foreign policy or domestic questions regarding budgetary priorities,
if these issues implicate concerns of justice and if justice is the moral
goal of law and lawyering. If justice requires an equal regard for the
dignity and worth of all individuals, then the current administration's
casual willingness to sacrifice the interests, needs, and lives of Iraqi
citizens toward the end of securing American prestige, wealth, or
position might be fairly condemned by the legal profession as an
unjust and therefore unlawful act. Similarly, the willingness to view
the educational opportunities of poor children as a low priority might
be fairly understood as skirting unlawfulness-it runs afoul of justice
and, hence, of law. If being a lawyer is fundamentally about being
14. See Frank I. Michelman, Foreword: On Protecting the Poor Through the Fourteenth
Amendment, 83 HARV. L. REV. 7 (1969).
15. See Richard A. Epstein, A Theory of Strict Liability, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 151, 168-69
(1973).
16. See JULES L. COLEMAN, RISKS AND WRONGS (1992); Jules L. Coleman, Tort Law and
the Demands of Corrective Justice, 67 IND. L.J. 349 (1991).
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committed to justice, then being a lawyer ought to be understood as
fundamentally about being committed to securing justice in the face
of unjust chauvinist ambitions internationally and aggressive class
warfare domestically. The legal profession, if it took seriously the
antipositivist understanding of law, could become and could view
itself as a bulwark against excessive and unjust patriotic fervor, as
well as a bulwark against flagrant injustice at home.
Surely it couldn't hurt, and it might help, to think of lawyers as
professionally committed to the project of understanding the
prerequisites of justice, in a culture with a legal system that claims to
dispense it, and then professionally obligated to either uphold or
critique it on the basis of their understanding of the degree to which
law meets the demand of justice. Professional philosophers, some
theologians, and some political theorists are of course committed to
the study of justice, and there is no reason to think that lawyers will
be either better suited or more inclined than the average citizen to
ponder the relative merits of competing theories of justice. On the
other hand, the mastery and application of competing theories of
legal and political justice is hardly beyond the competence of any
lawyer. And it is hard to think of any group, professional or
otherwise, other than lawyers, with the expertise and the professional
inclination to work through in a detailed way the implications of
various understandings of justice for various doctrinal areas of law.
There is no reason, in short, for lawyers not to at least acknowledge
the subject of justice as peculiarly within their province. It is a
curiosity, and maybe even a scandal, that lawyers in this century have
not done so.
II. INDETERMINACY
In light of these considerations, let me briefly revisit the
connection between antipositivism and the indeterminacy thesis.
Again, I do not want to argue that the moral principles of justice with
which law is arguably intertwined, in Dworkin's jurisprudence,
resolve indeterminacy. But I do want to suggest that Dworkin's
antipositivism should come as a welcome jurisprudential suggestion to
anyone who takes at least one interpretation of the indeterminacy of
law seriously. When put forward by most members of the critical legal
studies movement, the claim that "law is indeterminate" is not
typically put forward as asserting the indeterminacy of legal
conclusions; rather, what is typically being put forward is the
1999]
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indeterminacy of legal texts. And, when understood in that way, the
demonstrable indeterminacy of legal texts obviously does not imply
that legal conclusions are also indeterminate; it implies only that if
those conclusions are determined, then something other than the
legal texts themselves are doing the determining. In fact, as critical
scholars themselves often emphasize, legal conclusions are often
depressingly overdetermined even when the texts that conventionally
understood should authoritatively compel them are themselves
transparently indeterminate. This is not surprising or paradoxical; it
simply suggests that something else is doing the determining, other
than the texts.
And, what does determine legal conclusions, if legal texts do not?
Both realists and critical scholars have supplied a menu of
possibilities: conclusions may be compelled, for example, by judicial
disposition, by current "belief clusters" held by the ruling judicial
class, by rank prejudice, or by some hard-to-specify and perhaps
arbitrarily held cluster of judicial beliefs, emotions, and
predispositions. But if that's right, then Dworkin's antipositivist thesis
might best be understood as a complement to the indeterminacy
thesis, rather than (as he himself intended it) as a counterweight: one
possible determinant of outcomes that might be added to the list
developed by the realists and critics is that legal conclusions, although
not compelled by indeterminate legal texts, are determined by those
texts as interpreted through the lens of some specified conception of
political or legal justice. What Dworkin's jurisprudence essentially
holds out is the existential possibility that we can, through reason and
empathy, choose to fill the gap of legal indeterminacy by reference to
credible theories of justice, consciously developed, debated, and
refined.
Obviously, if one views law as a closed, determinate, positive
system of identified and identifiable legal materials, then the
insistence that legal conclusions must rest on a synthesis of law and
moral principles threatens to undermine that determinacy. But if, on
the contrary, one views legal texts as fundamentally indeterminate (as
do virtually all members of the critical legal studies movement), then
the possibility that legal arguments can render determinate and sound
conclusions by synthesizing the indeterminate texts with moral
principles should be a welcome suggestion. It suggests the possibility
of responding to the necessity of choice dictated by indeterminacy in
a way that is both overtly moral and overtly political. It suggests the
possibility of responding to the necessity of choice by forging a path
[Vol. 74:499
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toward justice.
III. OBJECTIONS TO ANTIPOSITIVISM
All of this, then, suggests a final question: Why hasn't Dworkin's
antipositivism been taken more seriously? There are a number of
reasons. Some are a consequence of arguments with which it was
conjoined in Dworkin's original formulation, some a consequence of
current political configurations, some attributable, I think, to
professional habit, and some that go directly to the merits of
antipositivism itself. Let me take them in that order.
First, Dworkin himself initially put forward his antipositivist
claim that legal argument incorporates moral principles as a
descriptive claim about the way law is, as evidenced by the way
lawyers actually talk, rather than as a prescriptive claim about the way
lawyers should talk and the way law should be constructed, and the
way law should be understood or interpreted. 7 This was surely a
strategic mistake, and possibly a conceptual one as well: the strength
of the claim that we ought to construct legal argument in a
nonpositivist way is surely unaffected by the claim that we presently
do so. And, as a descriptive matter, it is not at all clear that lawyers
ever talked in such a way as to evidence the antipositivism of
traditional legal argument, and it is increasingly clear that even if they
once did, they talk that way less and less now, as this current
symposium, in part, shows. Justice Antonin Scalia, to name just one
prominent lawyer, has expressed in dicta and holding overt hostility
toward the view that legal norms require the incorporation of moral
principles rather than positivistic authority.18 Public choice theorists
might similarly be expected to question the claim that legal norms
require as a condition of their legitimacy some threshold of justice,
rather than a credible claim of legislative support. Law and economics
scholars tend to interpret legal norms as resting both ideally and in
fact on an aspiration of efficiency, understood basically as the
maximal satisfaction of desire, rather than on any actual or ideal
threshold of justice. More broadly, law students often and perhaps
typically find Dworkin's descriptive account of legal argument
17. See TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY, supra note 1, at 14-130 (using case-specific examples
to refute positivism as a descriptive theory of law).
18. See Robin West, Foreword: Taking Freedom Seriously, 104 HARV. L. REV. 43, 54-60
(1990) (discussing the opinions in Saffle v. Parks, 494 U.S. 484 (1990); Butler v. McKellar, 494
U.S. 407 (1990); and Sawyer v. Smith, 497 U.S. 227 (1990), as examples of this tendency in
Justice Scalia's judicial opinions).
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unfamiliar and baffling; it doesn't seem to track their understanding
of what they are learning to do in their professional training. There is
no indication that the gap is filled upon their entrance to the
professional bar.
Of course, Dworkin himself does talk in the way he describes,
and he routinely, when writing for the educated lay audience, makes
the claim that "lawyers" generally think of law in the peculiarly
antipositivist way evidenced by his own writing.19 Furthermore, he can
easily identify at least a handful of cases in which judges do so as well.
But the very broad claim that legal argument is through and through
antipositivistic in the way that he describes, and that the
antipositivism at its core is borne out by the way "lawyers talk" in not
just a handful but virtually all cases, is just not borne out by the
evidence. Lawyers and courts do of course often identify moral
arguments as having a bearing on legal claims, but for the most part
they do so in a way that undercuts rather than supports the
antipositivism of Dworkin's jurisprudence. Often times, moral
arguments are "weighed" as an extra- or non-legal factor that might
come to bear in an otherwise underdetermined legal question, and at
worst (and not so infrequently) the identification of an argument as
"merely" moral, rather than legal, is enough to kill it. Supreme Court
candidates, as Dworkin himself laments, routinely disavow reliance
on their own moral preferences, political beliefs, or "prejudices," all
in favor of what they routinely identify as Rule of Law values that
aggressively eschew such an identification. 20 There is very little
evidence, if we take lawyers' discourse at face value, to support the
broad descriptive claim that lawyers' ways of speaking and thinking
about law evidence its antipositivist nature.
There is a second reason, also stemming from Dworkin's own
formulation of his position, that has resulted in our subsequent failure
to take sufficiently seriously Dworkin's antipositivism. Dworkin's
antipositivism is through and through tied to both a general and a
particular conception of rights, both of which are controversial. At the
general level, for Dworkin, law exists (in part) for the purpose of
enforcing our moral rights, and at the more specific level, our moral
rights consist, in turn, of entitlements not to be treated in certain ways
19. See RONALD DWORKIN, FREEDOM'S LAW 306-20 (1996) [hereinafter FREEDOM'S
LAW]; Ronald Dworkin, Sex, Death, and the Courts, N.Y. REV. BOOKS, Aug. 8, 1996, at 44, 50.
20. Dworkin discusses this disturbing phenomenon in FREEDOM'S LAW, supra note 19, at
306-20 (terming the phenomenon "the neutrality-thesis").
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by the state. 21 Our rights follow, in other words, as entailments from a
set of behaviors in which states, as a matter of political morality, may
not engage. What it means to have a "right" is to have an entitlement
not to be treated in a particular way by the state. Therefore, the
justice that law must incorporate as a condition of its own legality and
legitimacy is essentially a set of prescriptions against certain forms of
state actions, with correlative individual rights. The antipositivist
jurisprudential claim is then substantiated by a particular, and
particularly liberal, understanding of the relation of the individual
and the state and of the role of rights and of law in mediating that
relation.
However, neither the liberal insistence on the centrality of rights,
nor the liberal (or libertarian) understanding of rights as essentially
negative claims against certain forms of state action, is universally
shared by lawyers or even by the subset of lawyers for whom
Dworkin's descriptive claims about legal argument and legal practice
might ring true. For anyone who does not share Dworkin's basically
liberal view that the enforcement of rights is the highest function of
law, and the libertarian sounding claim that rights are essentially
prescriptions against certain forms of unjustified state action, the
Dworkinian conclusion that law necessarily incorporates a liberal
understanding of rights, of the individual and of the state, will seem
wrong and even imperialist, and antipositivism will bear the brunt of
this judgment. If for example, one holds the nonliberal view that the
highest function of law is not the enforcement of negative rights
against the state but the articulation of communitarian duties, or the
processual mediation of conflict, or the guarantee of safety or welfare,
or the enforcement of positive rights, and if one accepts the
Dworkinian claim that jurisprudential antipositivism requires the
centrality of negative, liberal rights, then its a short step to the
conclusion that something must be very wrong with antipositivism. If
negative rights constitute the logical bridge, so to speak, between the
worlds of positive law and of moral right, then the two worlds might
be better left logically separate. We might then form, rather than
discover, a bridge of some other constructed, rather than logical
substance.
The third reason has to do with professional norms and habits.
As students almost invariably complain, the Dworkinian understand-
ing of law as necessarily resting on a concept of justice is seemingly at
21. See TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY, supra note 1, at 266-78.
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odds with even the highest self-understanding of the practicing bar, to
say nothing of the actual practices. Lawyers are explicitly commanded
by various Codes to treat the zealous advocacy of their clients'
interests, not their own best understanding of the requisites of justice,
as defining the contours of their distinctively professional moral
responsibility. If lawyers are to read the law through the lens of client
interest, that is one thing, but if they are to read the law through the
lens of the best concept of justice available, that is another, and there
is no guarantee, and really no reason to think, that these two
interpretive methods will yield results that have anything at all to do
with one another. It is unrealistic to expect lawyers to do the
impossible. One or the other of these ethical precepts must yield. So
long as Codes of Responsibility are taken seriously, justice will not
be, wherever the two constraints lead to conflicting results.
The fourth reason Dworkin's antipositivism has been relatively
under-theorized is at the same time both conceptual and political, and
goes to the logic and politics of antipositivism itself. As Bentham
noted two hundred years ago, the antipositivist claim that law
incorporates justice can veer toward either an extreme and
conservative overidentification of the legal status quo with the
morally right22 - if law requires a minimal threshold of justice, then all
extant law must be just-or at the other pole, a radical or anarchic
identification of the positive extant state and its legal
pronouncements with lawlessness and the identification of true
"Law" with some utopian understanding of legal perfection. Either
extreme interpretation, of course, would be politically and morally
troubling, but when the practitioner is a constitutional lawyer, or a
class of constitutional lawyers, who are themselves obviously and
thoroughly identified with and relatively comfortable with the legal
ruling class (rather than, say, a revolutionary or civil disobedient), the
risks associated with the former interpretation- the overidentifica-
tion of extant law with ideals of justice-is far greater than the risk of
anarchy posed by the latter interpretation. And Dworkin's writings
do little to assuage the worry. Surely, what is most troubling about
Dworkin's writings and what leads many of us to recoil from his
antipositivism is the danger that he has romantically but wrongly
identified "American constitutional law," however it be determined,
with moral truth and political justice. It is, after all, one thing to urge
22. See JEREMY BENTHAM, A FRAGMENT ON GOVERNMENT 10-13 (J.H. Burns & H.L.A.
Hart eds., 1988) (1776).
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legal practitioners to read existing law in as morally just a way as
possible and to try to instill such an ethic as a professional standard. It
is another thing entirely, though, to urge that extant law is by
definition already just. The first is an attempt to enlist the legal
profession as a matter of professional identity in the cause of
achieving justice through law, in part through the hermeneutic
practice of interpreting it as generously and justly as possible. The
second, and equally plausible, interpretation of Dworkin's
antipositivism, however-the insistence that extant law (best
understood) is already just-sounds like a casual capitulation to the
temptation to view that which "is" as necessarily "good." It is, in
other words, a capitulation to the forces of legitimation.
The political problem, in short, with Dworkin's antipositivism is
simply that the difference between these two ways of understanding
what he is trying to make us do-to move the law hermeneutically
toward justice or to assert the extant law's necessary justice-is
largely a matter of attitude, not logic. A reformist or liberal lawyer
will interpret the mandate as one to refashion existing law in a just
manner; the conservative or regressive lawyer will interpret the
mandate as insisting on the justice of the status quo. It is likely the
case that lawyers are attitudinally a relatively conservative group. It is
not surprising then, that in spite of his evident liberal political stance,
Dworkin's antipositivism is widely regarded by at least some of his
critics as having a conservative and even Burkean flavor that renders
it unacceptable, at least in times of law's manifest imperfection.
Finally, and I think most importantly, Dworkin's antipositivism
has failed to take hold as even a normative ideal because it requires
the legal profession-academics, law students, lawyers, and judges-
to take moral argument seriously, and this is something we are
neither culturally nor professionally inclined to do. Lawyers are if
anything more inclined than other professionals or academics to be in
the grip of the prevailing moral relativism that now dominates both
the left and right political wings of the academy, and to a lesser extent
of popular culture as well: for the libertarian right, moral truth is
nothing but the satisfaction of as much desire as possible, through
free markets ideally, and through regulatory anticipation of market
outcomes where markets are impractical, and to the critical left,
moral truth is a perception created by shifting forces of political
power. Moral argument, as a practice, is regarded seriously by neither
wing, and the wings embrace more than a few. We are habitually, and
professionally, and increasingly intellectually, skeptical of the claim
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that justice can be understood, analyzed, or debated in rational form,
and are even more skeptical of the claim that our sense of justice can
or should be informed by generous moral sentiments. Against this
backdrop of moral skepticism, the antipositivist suggestion that legal
argument can lead to morally justified conclusions through the
incorporation of a moral theory of justice, threatens hypocrisy,
confusion, imperialism, legitimation, or obfuscation. If "moral truth"
is a mask for political power in turn propelled by the will to dominate,
or alternatively if claims of moral truth do nothing but frustrate the
satisfaction of desire, hence standing in the way of the creation of
value, then a theory of law which incorporates such truths has nothing
to offer but, in essence, villainy. It either perpetuates the ill-disguised
designs of the powerful or frustrates for no reason the creation of
value through the maximal satisfaction of the desires of all. Because it
forces us to take moral argument seriously, Dworkinian
antipositivism is at odds with the fundamental impulses of critical and
economic legal scholars both.
None of these reasons, in my view, constitute sound arguments
against the prima facie case for taking Dworkin's antipositivism
seriously. The possibly false descriptive claim-that lawyers do
presently talk in such a way as to evidence the antipositivism of legal
argument and legal conclusions-as I suggested above,23 is in no way a
necessary element of the prescriptive claim that lawyers ought to do
so and could be trained to do so. In fact, the falsity of the descriptive
claim makes the appeal of the prescriptive claim all the more evident.
The further we move away from the kinds of legal arguments
Dworkin thinks we do make, in other words, the more attractive the
form of argument he's urging upon us seems to be. As legal argument
becomes more and more positivistic, contrary to his descriptive claim,
the appeal of antipositivism seems greater and greater.
Similarly, there is no necessary connection between what we
might call Dworkin's rights thesis and his antipositivism. It may be
that the concept of "rights" is one way of bridging the gap between
legal and moral norms but it is not the only way. Furthermore, even if
we accept the Dworkinian rights thesis -that the nature and existence
of rights belies the positivist separation thesis-there is no reason to
accept his essentially libertarian understanding of rights as consisting
exclusively of entitlements to be free of certain forms of pernicious
state action. Dworkinian antipositivism is a logical vessel that can
23. See supra text accompanying notes 19-20.
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obviously be filled with any of a range of competing moral
conceptions of justice. There is no necessary connection between
antipositivism and liberal legalism-although it may be true, as
Dworkin has indefatigably argued-that liberal legalism is itself an
antipositivist jurisprudence. And there most assuredly is no necessary
connection between liberal legalism and a libertarian or negative
understanding of the essence of rights.
Third, that the moral self-understanding of the profession, as
well as their practices and governing Codes, reflects a professional
ethic of zealous client advocacy that is at odds with the Dworkinian
antipositivist conception of law, might suggest a reason to be skeptical
of Dworkinian antipositivism, but it might as well suggest a reason to
change the professional practices. It is beyond the scope of this essay
to discuss the merits of the latter strategy. Bill Simon's recent study,
The Practice of Justice, however, amply demonstrates at least the
viability of such an approach: he argues that it would not only be
desirable, but it would be more than possible, to change the Codes
and the practices they govern to reflect an antipositivist (which he
calls "substantivist") Dworkinian understanding of law and justice,
rather than a relativist and adversarial understanding.24 There are
problems with both Simon's proposal and its Dworkinian
underpinnings which I've written on elsewhere25 and won't belabor
here, but it minimally evidences the possibility of turning the
incompatibility of antipositivism and professional ethics into an
argument against the latter, rather than a hammer with which to
bludgeon the former.
Fourth, the possible conservatism of antipositivism is also not a
sufficient reason to dismiss at least Dworkin's version of it and for at
least two reasons. First, it may be the case that Dworkinian
antipositivism can lead to the wrongful identification of law with
justice and hence to an unjustifiably complacent legal profession. But
positivism also carries a political risk of unwarranted moral
complacency by the legal profession toward the status quo. While the
Dworkinian antipositivist's complacency is legitimated by his
insistence that law is necessarily just, the positivist's complacency is
legitimated (potentially) by his insistence that "law is law" and that is
all there is; that moral norms, by virtue of their nonlegal nature, have
24. See SIMON, supra note 9, at 37-42.
25. See Robin West, The Zealous Advocacy of Justice in a Less Than Ideal Legal World, 51
STAN. L. REv. 973 (1999).
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no nature, no force, and at any rate, no relevance to his work as a
lawyer. Both positivism and antipositivism, as jurisprudential stances,
are compatible with undue complacency and can become instruments
for the legitimation of a considerable degree of injustice:
antipositivism potentially does so by equating extant law with justice,
positivism potentially does so by denying the existence, force, or
relevance of nonlegal moral truths. It follows as a matter of simple
logic that it is something other than jurisprudence that determines the
critical acuity of the professional.
But furthermore, Dworkin's antipositivist thesis, or at least one
possible interpretation of it, might not be at odds with the best
understanding of legal positivism. Dworkin's antipositivism concerns
the nature of legal argument and legal conclusion: legal argument,
when done well, synthesizes the extant legal authorities with the best
available conception of legal justice, yielding correct and justified
legal conclusions. Legal positivism, best understood, asserts that even
the best, most generous, most morally appealing interpretation of law
should not be confused with moral truth and that to do so seriously
undermines the possibility of responsible moral criticism of law or of
power. Nothing in Dworkin's internal understanding of the nature of
legal argument undermines this critical positivist insight. It may be, as
Dworkin argues, that we should (and sometimes do) as lawyers, make
legal arguments on the basis of a synthesis of legal authority and
moral argumentation. It may also be, as positivists insist, that the
resulting conclusions, as well as their statutory and common law
bases, should not be confused with moral truth. They should be
understood, rather, as the legal professional's best attempt at making
good moral sense of extant legal materials. If those legal materials are
through and through base, or unjustifiable, or evil, then even the legal
professional's best attempt at making good moral sense of them will
presumably fall far short of morally justifiable outcomes. The moral
critic, standing either outside or inside the profession, is not
necessarily in danger of confusing legal outcome with moral truth
simply because the Dworkinian lawyer seeks to synthesize them or to
bring them into harmony.
If that's right, then positivists, although seemingly paradoxically,
may have a stake in taking Dworkin's antipositivism seriously. To a
substantial degree, the legal positivist's jurisprudential insistence that
moral truth must be kept theoretically "separate" from legal mandate
is prompted by the moral impulse to preserve the intellectual
coherence of the moral criticism of law. But such an impulse might be
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strengthened, rather than weakened, by the Dworkinian insistence
that the legal professional, acting as a professional, should seek to
synthesize the two. The lawyer who tries to do so, after all, unlike the
lawyer who denies the need or importance of claims of justice, will at
least attune herself or himself to the realm of moral argument, moral
truth, and claims of justice. It's at least possible that the lawyer who
develops a professional sensitivity to such arguments will also be
sensitive to the degree--and it may be considerable or negligible--to
which a synthesis of law and justice cannot be forged, because of the
rockbottom immorality or injustice of existing law. The lawyer who
seeks to synthesize law and justice in the antipositivist spirit urged by
Dworkin may be better suited to, not disabled from, the essentially
Hartian task of identifying, and protesting, the injustice of law, where
such a synthesis is clearly beyond the realm of legal possibility.
Lastly, that Dworkin's antipositivism forces the legal profession
and academy to take seriously the project of objective moral
argument is surely a virtue and not a vice of antipositivist
jurisprudence. Our refusal to do so over the last thirty years has left
us with unpalatable alternatives: the nihilist insistence on the left that
all there is in the social world worth pondering is power; the
libertarian insistence on the right that all that can be justified is the
satisfaction through market mechanisms of desire; and the
fundamentalist and generally religious-based claim that the authority
for moral truth must come from not just extra-legal but extra-human
sources. These stances cannot possibly yield theories of justice, or
moral truth, sufficient to ground morally compelling legal arguments.
We know this and as a result have eschewed the project of justice
altogether. As a result we have created an academic and professional
world void of any sense of virtue and even ignorant of the competing
possible conceptions of the virtue of justice that at least in the eyes of
others ought to be the defining virtue of the legal profession and legal
academy both. We have even managed to create, in the minds of
many, a falsely sophisticated impression that these lackings are signs
of intellectual maturity. But they are not; they are signs of the
intellectual backwardness, the moral narcissism, or at best, the
childishness, of a profession that refuses to engage the work of
deliberating over the social good and the legal right and its own place
in the societal work of securing both. We need to correct this quite
disastrous professional and intellectual misstep. Until we embrace the
work of taking moral argument seriously, it will be very hard to take
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legal argument (or lawyers) seriously and it will be even harder to
understand why we, or anyone else for that matter, should.
